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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
Nos. 18-1498 & 18-1499 
________________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
       Appellee/Cross-Appellant 
 
v.  
 
MARK A. CIAVARELLA, JR., 
 
       Appellant/Cross-Appellee  
     ________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 3-09-cr-00272-002) 
District Judge: Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 7, 2019 
 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed March 29, 2019) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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This is a habeas appeal in the infamous “kids-for-cash” scandal.  A former 
Pennsylvania judge argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to raise a 
statute-of-limitations defense, and the appeal centers on the prejudice wrought by the 
deficient lawyering: Would a proper timeliness defense have resulted in the judge’s 
acquittal on charges of racketeering, money-laundering conspiracy, and mail fraud?  
Because we determine the answer is “yes” as to racketeering and money-laundering and 
“no” as to mail fraud, we affirm the District Court in full. 
Background 
Mark Ciavarella, a judge of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, accepted 
nearly $3 million in kickbacks from the owner and builder of two private prisons that 
housed juvenile inmates.  In exchange, he sentenced children to long stays in juvenile 
detention for minor offenses.  He was convicted of racketeering, money-laundering, mail 
fraud, tax fraud, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. 
We focus on the failure by Ciavarella’s trial counsel to raise a statute-of-
limitations defense.  Both parties agree that his counsel was ineffective.  But was that 
prejudicial?  That, in turn, depends on whether any of Ciavarella’s convictions punished 
conduct that should have been off-limits by the statute of limitations — in this case, 
crimes committed before September 2004. 
Based on the jury’s verdict, the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Ciavarella received kickbacks in the form of three wire transfers in 2003.  To 
conceal these payments, he lied about his income in annual filings to the Administrative 
Office of Pennsylvania Courts in April 2004 and each April thereafter through 2007.  In 
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addition, the jury convicted Ciavarella of racketeering and money-laundering 
conspiracies that, as charged, straddled the limitations period by running from 2001 to 
2009. 
 On direct appeal, we affirmed all but one conviction.  Unlike their faulty approach 
to most other counts, Ciavarella’s trial lawyers had raised a timeliness challenge to the 
conviction for the April 2004 financial filing.  Because that filing occurred before the 
limitations window of September 2004, we vacated the conviction.  See United States v. 
Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 734 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 Seeking collateral relief, Ciavarella brought a motion to vacate other convictions 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court did so for racketeering and money-
laundering on the ground that Ciavarella’s counsel was ineffective, denied the motion to 
vacate as to the counts for mail fraud, and denied Ciavarella’s claim that the jury 
instructions were faulty in light of the Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in United 
States v. McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).  Both Ciavarella and the Government have 
appealed. 
Analysis 
 We deal with three discrete issues.  Each devolves to whether an error by trial 
counsel was prejudicial.  To meet his burden as to prejudice, Ciavarella must show a 
“reasonable probability” that, absent his counsel’s error, the outcome of his trial would 
have been different.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). 
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A. Racketeering and Money-Laundering Conspiracies 
The jury convicted Ciavarella of receiving kickbacks in 2003 (outside the 
limitations period) but acquitted him of charges relating to kickbacks from 2004 and later 
(within the limitations period).  As noted, it also convicted him of racketeering and 
money-laundering conspiracies that were alleged to have run from 2001 to 2009.   
Targeting those conspiracy convictions, Ciavarella argues that competent trial 
counsel would have excluded the 2003 kickbacks on limitations grounds.  As a result, he 
maintains that the jury would have had nothing on which to base its convictions for 
racketeering and money-laundering.  In response, the Government points out that 
Ciavarella was also convicted of submitting fraudulent financial filings in 2005, 2006, 
and 2007 — in other words, well into the limitations period.  The Government maintains 
that the filings furthered the conspiracies by concealing the kickbacks. 
Thus the habeas petition presents whether the jury based its conspiracy 
convictions on the 2003 kickbacks alone (in which case the conspiracy charges should 
have been time-barred) or on the subsequent financial filings (if so, the charges were 
timely).  Because it concluded there was a “reasonable probability” of the former 
scenario, the District Court vacated Ciavarella’s conspiracy convictions.   
We agree and thus affirm.  We cannot say for certain whether the jury believed 
that the racketeering and money-laundering conspiracies ended before September 2004.  
But such a belief seems “reasonably probable” in light of the jury’s acquittal on all 
kickbacks after 2003.   
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B. Mail Fraud 
Ciavarella was convicted of mail fraud for filing financial statements in 2005, 
2006, and 2007 (within the limitations period) that concealed his kickback income earned 
in 2003 (before the limitations period).  He argues that an adequate statute-of-limitations 
defense by his trial counsel would have resulted in an acquittal on the charges of mail 
fraud.   
Here we disagree.  Although the underlying conduct that supported the fraud 
occurred before 2004, the financial statements were not submitted — and the crime of 
mail fraud was therefore not completed — until after 2004.  Indeed, our Court on direct 
appeal already explained that the 2003 kickbacks were enough to support convictions for 
mail fraud in 2005–07.  See Ciavarella, 716 F.3d at 730.  As a result, we affirm the 
District Court’s denial of habeas relief on these convictions. 
C. McDonnell Instruction 
After Ciavarella’s trial, the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of “official act” 
for purposes of bribery.  See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2361.  In light of this decision, 
Ciavarella argues that he deserves a new trial with different jury instructions on the 
meaning of “official act.”   
For two reasons, we disagree.  First, Ciavarella’s counsel failed to preserve this 
claim by challenging the jury instructions at trial, and Ciavarella cannot provide any 
reason to excuse this procedural default.  In particular, it is no excuse that he was 
convicted before McDonnell was decided.  Although “subsequent legal developments 
have made counsel’s task easier,” a McDonnell-style challenge was “available” at the 
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time of Ciavarella’s conviction.  See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 537 (1986) (noting 
that “various forms of the claim [the petitioner] now advances had been percolating in the 
lower courts for years at the time of his original appeal”). 
Second, Ciavarella’s bribery-related actions still satisfy even a post-McDonnell 
understanding of “official act.”  If sentencing hundreds of juvenile offenders to excessive 
terms of incarceration is not an “official act,” then nothing is.  See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) 
(defining “official act” in part as “any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, 
suit, proceeding or controversy . . . which may by law be brought before any public 
official, in such official’s official capacity”); see also McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2371–72. 
In this context, we affirm the District Court in full. 
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